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Abstract 
 
This paper will explore commonalities and processes that led to genocide 
in the twentieth century.  Information from four notable genocides will be used to 
determine the feasibility of genocide continuing unabated into the twenty first 
century.  Armenian, Holocaust, Cambodian and Rwandan genocides have similar 
qualities establishing a “recipe” for others to use as a template or as a predictor 
of the next genocide.  This thesis will use psychological theory, case studies and 
historical data to formulate reasons why individuals can be easily persuaded to 
take on the role as perpetrator.  Has the international community done enough to 
either prevent or identify potential genocides?  If not, where are the likely 
hotspots that genocide will prosper in the future?  The review concludes with this; 
without an international paradigm shift, genocide will flourish in the twenty first 
century.  
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Introduction 
Genocide is the leading cause of preventable deaths in the twentieth and 
twenty first centuries, taking even more lives than war. From the Armenian 
genocide in 1915 to the genocide in Rwanda in 1994, the world is no more 
inclined to intervene to prevent future genocide today than it has been in the past 
110 years. This thesis will explore the causes leading to genocide and give the 
reader a better understanding of the intricacies in the formation of genocide. 
Using professional insight, along with identifying patterns showing commonalities 
among the perpetrators and victims, it will become clear how genocide in the 
twenty first century will probably continue to occur.  Finally, we will see how 
societal markers may lead to the prediction of future genocidal acts (Blum 1). 
While wars are being fought with modern weapons against opposing military 
forces, genocide is being carried out against non-combatants by low tech 
weapons as guns, fire, rape, drowning and machetes.   
 Genocide tears at the very fabric of what is good and decent and it is 
incomprehensible that normal people can create such horrid violence on select 
groups or races of people on such a grand scale and justify it. It is estimated 
between 60 and 120 million men, women and children experienced the brutality 
of genocide in the twentieth century. These individuals were not combatants; 
however, they were being killed as an extension of war, even though they are not 
participants. A crime of unparalleled devastation to our fellow man gives the 
impression that pure evil could be lurking in each of us. To try and pinpoint 
reasons for genocide we must peer into the psychological, political and 
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fundamental reasons for the actions of so many to commit genocide. Will the 
twenty first century be a continuation of the macabre, or can it be prevented? 
There is a great deal of rhetoric for the need to stop genocide; however, the 
international community has shown a lack of fortitude or clarity to intercede 
militarily or continue to use peacekeeping forces.   
 On April 7, 2004 United Nations Secretary-General Kofi’ Annan 
established a Five Point Action Plan for the prevention of genocide. He 
proclaimed, “We must first acknowledge our responsibility for not having done 
more to prevent or stop the genocide.  We must never forget our collective failure 
to protect at least 800,000 defenseless men, women and children who perished 
in Rwanda 10 years ago” (Annan).  The United Nations had its beginnings in 
1945 with a membership of 51 counties with the purpose of a commitment to 
maintaining international peace.  Since this time the world has experienced at 
least five major genocides;.   
As we attempt to learn the lessons of the genocide in Rwanda, two 
messages should be paramount. First, never forget. Second, never 
stop working to prevent genocide. Our thoughts go to the victims --
the more than 800,000 innocent people who lost their lives with 
terrifying speed.  Our thoughts go to the survivors. Their resilience 
continues to inspire us. It is the responsibility of us all to support 
them in rebuilding their lives. How different it would have been, had 
we, the international community, and acted properly at the proper 
time. (Ki Moon) 
 
 The United Nations Convention on Genocide in 1948 was founded on the 
principle of protecting the innocent from genocide, after the European Holocaust.  
Failing to predict the genocide in Darfur in 2004 does not bode well for the United 
Nations ability to prevent genocide in the twenty first century.  It is imperative that 
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organizations like the United Nations predict, prevent or respond to major crises 
in a timely manner to stop the unnecessary loss of innocent lives.  
 The genocide in Rwanda was the most well publicized genocide of the 
twentieth century, due mainly to technological advancements in media collection.  
Even so, 800,000 Rwandans lost their lives in a span of 100 days.  Ten years 
after the genocide, the United Nations formulated a ten step plan to stop future 
genocides (Annan).  The failure of the UN in its duty as an international entity to 
protect the people of Darfur is typical and symptomatic of the problems existing 
in the prevention of genocides in the twenty first century.  The fact is, the world 
stood by and watched a country disintegrate into absolute chaos and brutality 
with little to no international support.   
 While the international community may want to intercede, the geo-politics 
of genocide mean that we must be able to recognize and define it. Since the 
beginning of the twentieth century, mass murder, genocide, democide are 
becoming more horrific, brutal, and deadly if for no other reason but the sheer 
number of victims.   
Improved and coordinated communications in the modern world could be 
a reason the perpetrators, such as the Hutus and sympathizers in Rwanda, 
become more efficient and expedient in dispatching their victims.  Wars in the 
modern age are being fought with a higher degree of technology, inflicting a 
larger number of casualties among combatants.  
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This review will define genocide, discuss the psychology of genocide, and 
concluded with a format for predicting genocide.  If we do not predict and 
prevent, we will repeat these brutal acts in the future.   
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Chapter One:   Genocide 
International Definition of Genocide 
The modern age brings new reasons and justifications for committing 
genocide.  Mass killing of civilians on ideological grounds “in the name of the 
people’, whether ethnically driven (as against Armenians, Jews, Bosnian 
Muslims, Albanian Kosovars or Rwandan Tutsis) or class-driven (as in the 
Stalinist anti-kulak terror or Pol Pots’ classicide’) forms a crucial component of 
what makes modern political violence modern (Waller xii).  
Genocide is not war, mass murder or ethnic cleansing.  The term 
genocide was first coined by Raphael Lemkin in 1943.  Lemkin, a Polish-Jewish 
legal scholar and refugee commented in his book, Axis Rule in Occupied Europe, 
genocide is “the co-ordinate and planned annihilation of a national, religious, or 
racial group by a variety of actions aimed at foundation essential to the survival 
of the group “(Lemkin 79). 
  On December 9, 1948, the United Nations took his idea a step further 
and adopted Article II of the United Nations Convention on the Prevention of the 
Crime of Genocide.  Article II specifically defines genocide as “acts committed 
with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnic racial or religious 
group” causing them serious bodily or mental harm, creating conditions 
calculated to bring about their physical destruction, preventing births, or forcibly 
transferring children to another group” (Waller xi).   
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Ethnic Cleansing 
 Ethnic cleansing is sometimes used incorrectly as a synonym for 
genocide.  Unlike genocide, it has no legal standing and its perpetrators have a 
different agenda that can, and most likely will, lead to genocide (Blum 204).  
 Ethnic cleansing has been defined in this way: 
Ethnic cleansing falls below the horrible threshold of intention to 
exterminate when compared to the brutality experienced during the 
German orchestrated genocide.  Ethnic cleansers may take Hitler 
seriously without sharing his commitment to total elimination.  
Ethnic cleansing is far easier than the murder of an entire group, 
and serves most nationalist governments just as well. Nationalists 
who wish to build a nationally homogenous state need not kill all 
member of a minority population:  killing many to remove most is 
sufficient.  (Snyder 200)    
 
The Bosnian War is the modern example of what is considered ethnic 
cleansing.  The Bosnian War had its start when the Communist country of 
Yugoslavia became divided by the death of its leader Josip Broz Tito in 1980.  
Yugoslavia consisted of the Republics of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Slovenia, 
Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro. Yugoslavian President Tito was an expert at 
maintaining a balance among the many ethnic regions. After his death in 1980, 
the separate republics wrestled for control of the government and in 1991 and 
1992 all of the republics declared independence and became sovereign states.  
The Serbian and Croatian solution to the problem of separate states was to push 
for ethnic nationalism. Serbian President, Slobodan Milosevic appealed to all 
Serbs in the republics to support his plan for a Greater Serbia.  Milosevic was 
able to produce, “Fierce propaganda depicting Muslims as extreme 
fundamentalists was causing many Serbs to support Milosevic’s plan for ethnic 
9 
 
 
 
 
cleansing as a means of creating this Greater Serbia” (Bosnian).  Ethnic 
cleansing of the Muslims expanded to include all who opposed the “Greater 
Serbia.” This period of ethnic cleansing resulted in over 230,000 deaths.  
The term ethnic cleansing was first used by former Serbian President, 
Slobodan Milosevic.  As leader of the Serbian Forces in the Bosnian War, 
Milosevic explained his reasoning for the onslaught of murder and torture against 
the Croats, Kosovan, Muslims and Albanian people.  He saw it as a way to stop 
what he believed was ethnic cleansing by the Bosnians and Croats Armies 
against the Serbian population.   Before the massacre in Srebrenica, Serbian 
commanders had used the code word “etnicko ciscernj” meaning cleansing of the 
region (Snyder 210).  Milosevic died in prison before the completion of his trial.  
William Schabas, a professor of international law, differentiates ethnic cleansing 
from genocide as, “One is intended to displace a population, the other to destroy 
it.  The issue is one of intent and logically inconceivable that the two agendas 
coexist.  Ethnic cleansing is a warning sign of genocide to come.  Genocide is 
the last resort of the frustrated ethnic cleanser” (Schabas 200).   
Historically, ethnic cleansing was also a precursor to genocide in 1933 
Germany (Schabas 1994).  The Nazi’s initial policy was to coerce the Jews to 
leave Germany.  The major stumbling block was the Jew’s inability to find a 
country that would take them in.  At this point the Nazi policy was ethnic 
cleansing.  During this period Jews were persecuted, anti-Semitic laws were 
passed, and surges of violence arose.  Later when the war with Russia began, 
the Nazi policy shifted to annihilation of all Jews in Europe. The Jews were no 
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longer able to emigrate, even if another country would accept them.  This is when 
Nazi Germany’s ethnic cleansing became genocide.  During the Eichmann trial, 
the Israeli District Court stated, “a doubt remains in our minds whether there was 
here that specific intention to exterminate’, as required by the definition of 
genocide” (Schabas 200). 
In the modern world, wars are being fought with a higher degree of 
technology, inflicting a larger number of casualties among combatants and 
civilians, “By the Second World War, military front and home front were scarcely 
divisible; this was not a popular war in the sense of the full involvement of the 
peoples of Europe in the fighting, and the suffering” (Kershaw 110).   
Raphael Lemkin differentiates war from genocide as, “war is directed 
against sovereigns and armies, not against subjects and civilians” (Lemkin 80). 
The four genocides in this thesis were conceived before but took place after a 
war had started.  The Turk’s deep hatred for the Armenians began in the 
previous century; the actual genocide began at the same time as World War I.  
The German persecution of the Jews had its start in the early 1930’s and the 
“Final Solution” began in 1941, two years after the start of World War II.  The 
Khmer Rouge gained their power after the Vietnam and Cambodian Civil War in 
1975 and immediately initiated genocide.  In Rwanda, the Hutu government was 
battling the Tutsi-dominated Rwandan Patriotic Army coming across the border in 
Burundi prior to the most recent genocide. 
 Modern age genocides can begin for a myriad of reasons, usually leading 
to war; however, there are common threads or patterns present in the genocides 
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of the twentieth century.  “While there may be multiple motives for genocide, 
hating another’s group is the perennial rallying point. That notion is particularly 
troubling since for most of us, the group is “we” and “we” are not about to give it 
up without a good fight” (Baum 3). Dr. Gregory H. Stanton, President of 
Genocide Watch: The International Alliance to End Genocide presented a 
briefing paper to the US State Department in 1996 on the genocidal processes 
including what he identified as the eight stages of genocide (Table 2) and how to 
prevent genocide during each stage (Stanton 3).  Dr. Stanton concluded there 
were enough early signs of a coming genocide for the international community to 
stop the genocide in Rwanda.  When it became clear the violent situation was 
worsening, the closing of many of the embassies removed the “eyes” of the 
international community and reduced the confirmation needed before any state’s 
policy makers can take action. Table 1 summarizes the four prominent genocides 
in the twentieth century for this thesis while Table 2 lists the eight stages of 
Gregory Stanton’s briefing to the UN. The stages are easily discernable and 
appear to be similar in their methodical planning, execution and end results. 
 
Table 1:  20th Century Genocides  
 
Location 
& Time 
Target 
Population 
Aggressors Est. 
Casualties 
Prime 
Causes 
Likelihood 
of 
Repetition 
1912-
1915 
Turkey 
Armenians Ottoman 
Turkey 
1.5 Million Religion  
Nationalism 
High 
probability 
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1933- 
1945 
  
Nazi 
Germany 
& 
Occupied 
Europe  
Jews, 
Gypsies, 
Critics; Non 
Aryan  
Political 
opponents 
Homosexuals 
Mentally 
Defective  
Germans 
specifically 
Nazi 
6 million 
Jews and 
other 
ethnic 
groups 
with a total 
estimate of 
20 million 
Nationalism 
Retaliation 
Low 
probability 
in 
Germany.  
Very 
Possible in 
the Middle 
East. 
1975-
1979 
 
Cambodia 
(Khmer 
Rouge) 
 
Perceived 
enemies of 
the state 
“New 
People” 
Educated, 
Profession   
Foreign 
born 
Religious 
groups 
3.3 Million Ideology of 
returning to 
an agrarian 
society. 
Political 
opponents 
Medium 
probability 
Rwanda 
1994-
1994 
Tutsi people Hutu 800,000 Retaliation  High 
probability 
 
   The first large scale genocide of the twentieth century began in 1912 
when the Turkish government killed over 1.5 million Armenian Christians during a 
four year period.  The world view of the genocide in Armenia was the elimination 
of the Armenians because of their Christian heritage.  If this were the reason, 
why did Turkey tolerate the Armenians in their empire since the fourteenth 
century?                                        
From the fourteenth century to the beginning of the Balkan War of 1912-
1913, Turkey had amassed control of a large part of Europe’s western regions. 
As many of the Balkan states were successfully gaining independence, the 
Ottoman Empire was weakening.  The Ottoman Empire losses were extensive.  
Through rebellion, independence and war, over 85% of its European conquest 
had been lost.  
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Table 2.  Eight Stages of Genocide and Prevention 
Stage Explanation 
1.  Classification All cultures have categories to distinguish people into “us and 
them” by ethnicity, race, religion, or nationality: German and 
Jew, Hutu and Tutsi. Bipolar societies that lack mixed 
categories, such as Rwanda and Burundi, are the most likely to 
have genocide. 
2. Symbolization We give names or other symbols to the classifications. We 
name people “Jews” or “Gypsies”, or distinguish them by colors 
or dress; and apply the symbols to members of groups. 
Classification and symbolization are universally human and do 
not necessarily result in genocide unless they lead to the next 
stage, dehumanization. 
3. Dehumanization One group denies the humanity of the other group. Members of 
it are equated with animals, vermin, insects or diseases. 
Dehumanization overcomes the normal human revulsion 
against murder. At this stage, hate propaganda in print and on 
hate radios is used to vilify the victim group. 
4. Organization Genocide is always organized, usually by the state, often using 
militias to provide deniability of state responsibility (the 
Janjaweed in Darfur.) Sometimes organization is informal 
(Hindu mobs led by local RSS militants) or decentralized 
(terrorist groups.) Special army units or militias are often 
trained and armed. Plans are made for genocidal killings.  
5  Polarization Extremists drive the groups apart. Hate groups broadcast 
polarizing propaganda. Laws may forbid intermarriage or social 
interaction. Extremist terrorism targets moderates, intimidating 
and silencing the center. Moderates from the perpetrators’ own 
group are most able to stop genocide, so are the first to be 
arrested and killed. 
6. Preparation Victims are identified and separated out because of their ethnic 
or religious identity. Death lists are drawn up. Members of 
victim groups are forced to wear identifying symbols. Their 
property is expropriated. They are often segregated into 
ghettoes, deported into concentration camps, or confined to a 
famine-struck region and starved. 
7. Extermination Begins, and quickly becomes the mass killing legally called 
“genocide.” It is “extermination” to the killers because they do 
not believe their victims to be fully human. When it is 
sponsored by the state, the armed forces often work with 
militias to do the killing. Sometimes the genocide results in 
revenge killings by groups against each other, creating the 
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In 1912 when the Armenians asked for reforms to achieve more 
autonomy, the memory of the rebellious Christian countries of the Balkans 
invoked rage against the Armenians.  With the losses in the Balkan War fresh in 
their memories, many Turkish citizens rallied in the streets shouting, “Down with 
equality!”, “The Balkan dogs are trampling on Islam.” (Balakian 161).  The 
Armenians became the enemy and were used as scapegoats for the empire’s 
demise. 
In Turkey, non-Muslim populations living in the Ottoman Empire held the 
status of infidel, living under the protection of the Muslim Turkish ruling order.  At 
this point the classification stage of genocide began (Balakian xv).  The new 
Turkish government began implementing plans to form a pure nationalistic 
Muslim state.  The Armenians became a barrier to the Turkish plan.  The 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP), the official name for the “Young Turks” 
began passing despotic laws to further the cause of nationalism, thus militarizing 
the government.  A great number of Turks disliked the Armenians due to their 
downward whirlpool-like cycle of bilateral genocide (as in 
Burundi). 
8. Denial It is the eighth stage that always follows genocide. It is among 
the surest indicators of further genocidal massacres. The 
perpetrators of genocide dig up the mass graves, burn the 
bodies, try to cover up the evidence and intimidate the 
witnesses. They deny that they committed any crimes, and 
often blame what happened on the victims. They block 
investigations of the crimes, and continue to govern until driven 
from power by force, when they flee into exile. There they 
remain with impunity, like Pol Pot or Idi Amin, unless they are 
captured and a tribunal is established to try them. 
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perception as being wealthy, particularly because they were of the minority and 
Christian in religion and culture. Few were wealthy but many were poor peasants 
who bore the brunt of this rage (Balakian 23). 
The government of Turkey seized upon this rage and methodically 
ushered in a new nationalistic furor and “Turkification” of their youth.  Paramilitary 
youth were issued rifles and ammunition in “defense of the fatherland” (Balakian 
163).  The wheels were now set into motion to unify the Muslim population 
against the alleged internal enemy, the Armenians.   
On April 25, 1909, Adana, the last independent Armenian region, came 
under violent attack from overzealous Muslim Turks who looted and burned 
shops owned by the Armenians and Jewish communities.  During the fray in 
Adana, Turkish soldiers stood by, and in some cases, assisted in the attacks and 
mass murder. The national media 
declared that the Armenians were 
attacking Turkish forces, creating 
anger and fanning the flames of 
nationalism that sparked future 
attacks against the Armenians.  
The Turkish government used a systematic approach to rid Turkey of the 
Armenian problem.  Men were evacuated from towns and executed, women 
raped repeatedly and some, as noted by investigative journalist Robert Fisk, 
Figure 1  Armenian mass grave 
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“were stuffed into caves and asphyxiated by brush fires as primitive gas 
chambers” (Balakian 176).  
 The new Turkish government began implementing plans to form a pure 
nationalistic Muslim state.  The Armenians stood as a barrier to the Turkish plan. 
Just prior to the outbreak of War World I, Turkey forged a secret alliance with 
Germany to protect itself from Russia allowing many German troops to be 
stationed in Turkey, who eventually became witnesses to the Armenian 
Genocide.  At the start of World War I the religious leader of the Ottoman Empire 
issued a proclamation of jihad against the Christians.   
In 1915 the systematic extermination of the Armenian people began by 
targeting cultural and community leaders to weaken Armenian resolve, “The plan 
was to eliminate all Armenian writers, political activists, artists, teachers, and 
church and civic leaders.”  According to United States Ambassador Henry 
Morgenthau, killing squads, police, and soldiers, stripped, executed, mutilated or 
deported Armenians into the Syrian Desert to die of disease and starvation.  
Armenian men drafted into the Turkish Army were then disarmed and forced into 
labor battalions and summarily executed.  A secret organization called the 
“Special Organization” was developed to protect Turkey from internal and 
external threats. State sponsored killing squads using convicts were established 
to expedite the Armenian liquidation and create an excuse for genocide 
deniability.  The Turkish population and other Muslim groups plundered what the 
Armenians were forced to leave behind.  When it was all said and done, the great 
majority of the Armenian population no longer existed (Balakian 154).  To this 
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day, Turkey denies that the Armenian genocide ever occurred (Balakian 225).  In 
1984 the United States Congress tried to pass a resolution commemorating the 
Armenian genocide.  Turkey threatened retaliation by, “closing military bases in 
Turkey and to terminate defense contracts with U.S. firms” (Balakian 387).  The 
resolution was withdrawn and resubmitted as a bill in 1989, 2000 and 2007.  On 
March 4, 2010, U.S. Congressman Gary Ackerman spoke at the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee on why a resolution recognizing the Armenian Genocide is 
imperative.  “If you forget an injustice then it doesn’t occur.  If you forget 
something that was wrong you will no longer be able to tell right from wrong, 
because wrong then goes away” (Ackerman). 
 The Armenian genocide happened over 95 years ago, so why should we 
be concerned about the Armenian tragedy today?  The answer lies in the events 
that have happened since.  A terrible pattern of annihilation repeated itself time 
and time again in the twentieth century.  The Armenian Genocide became the 
template which other genocides in the twentieth century came to mimic.   
 Hitler knew his decision to carry out the ‘Final Solution” would be 
successful and that the world would not intervene or remember what happened 
to the Jewish population.  As he states to his military staff, “Who still talks 
nowadays about the extermination of the Armenians”? In April 1945, exactly 30 
years after the Armenian genocide, allied forces liberated the death camps of 
Nazi Germany.  
Nazi Germany killed six million Jews and 14 million more from other 
groups over a thirteen year period ending in 1945.  The public reason for the 
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Holocaust was the elimination of the Jewish people.  This reasoning is too 
simplistic and hides the fact of Germany’s goal of European dominance.  At the 
end of World War I, a clause in the1919 Treaty of Versailles required Germany to 
pay $132 billion in German marks as reparations for instigating the war.  This 
clause placed Germany on the road to hyperinflation, which nearly forced 
Germany into bankruptcy.  The anger from the German people paying a so called 
“guilt clause” left the proud German people searching for a government to bring 
back Germany’s economy and stature in the world (de Pommereau 2).  The 
difficult life caused by the war and the embarrassment of the German society 
along with the political upheaval of the time, gave rise to a Nationalist Party 
(Nazi) along with its leader, Adolph Hitler, to fill a leadership void.  
In his book, Mein Kampf, Hitler documented his revulsion toward the 
Jewish people and laid the blame on the Jews for all of the problems befalling 
Germany.  On November 9, 1938 an arranged angry protest erupted over the 
killing of a low-level German diplomat at the German Embassy in Paris by a 
young Jew.  This carnage is known as Night of Broken Glass (Kristallnacht). 
Throughout Germany, uncontested looting and burning resulted in over ninety-
one Jewish deaths and over 8,000 Jewish businesses, shops, synagogues and 
apartments had been burned to the ground while the Nazi police and fireman 
stood by and sometimes participated. Over 20,000 Jews were taken into custody 
and 10,000 of them were sent to Buchenwald concentration camp (Rutherford 
45-51).   
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Later that year, Jews were required to forfeit their property to the state, 
they were forbidden to go to cinemas, and Jews were only allowed to rent to 
Jews forming a “ghetto” like condition, placing most Jews in one section of the 
cities.  This evolution of increasing violence was in all probability, a preamble to 
the next step which includes mass killing or genocide.  The growing violence 
often expands to more groups than just the targeted one.  This expansion can 
take place over an extended period, with periods of calmness.  It is a central 
feature of intense group violence.  
In 1939 Hitler formulated his plan to attack and invade Poland, along with 
the annexing of the German speaking countries of Austria and Czechoslovakia to 
expand Germany’s heritage to the Germans under Non-German rule (Staub 
379).  The annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia, and later the invasion of 
Poland, were met with little resistance from the international community because 
they did not want to provoke the Germans in to a world war. 
  Inaction by the international community’s gave a free reign of terror for 
the Nazis to increase their 
aggression toward the Jewish 
people.  The Nazis considered their 
victims nothing more than 
“subhuman” placing them into a 
category that gives the victims no 
status as human beings, and killing 
them is not murder, it becomes “the Figure 2 Mass executions in Nazi occupied Ukraine 
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slaughter of a lowly animal” (Lang 228). The extermination extended into 
occupied lands beyond that of the Jewish people to other minority ethnic groups, 
Poles, Russians and Gypsies.  Germany was setting up a utopian society based 
on the idea that the Aryan race was the only pure race and should be the only 
ones given status in the revitalized Germany.  
In 1941 Henrich Himler (SS) orders establishment of the Auschwitz, 
Birkenau concentration camps.  The first prisons were occupied by the Poles and 
then followed by Jews. The killings in the concentration camps began around 
January of 1942 until April 1945.  During this period Jews were gassed, shot, 
burned alive and experimented on by German scientist.  Germany also 
established the, Einsatzgruppen (SS paramilitary death squads) that were 
“mobile units sent into German occupied lands to specifically kill Jews. They 
numbered 3,000 and were organized into seven units.  They were, “led by the 
intellectual elite of the Nazi party.  Of the 25 leaders 15 bore the title of PhD, 
most of them doctors of jurisprudence or philosophy” (Einsatzgruppen).  In 
addition, killing squads, Police Battalions and the Security Service (SS), assisted 
the Einsatzgruppen in the murdering of Jews throughout Europe.  It has been 
estimated that over 6 million Jews and millions more of other ethnic origins were 
killed during this period. Genocide continues in Southeast Asia. 
 In 1975 the Khmer Rouge of Cambodia killed 1.7 million people or twenty 
percent of the population, over a four year period.  The public reason for the 
Cambodian genocide was the political philosophy of achieving a sovereign 
Cambodia not controlled by foreign interest.  Cambodia had little conflict until the 
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escalation of the war in Vietnam and 
the aerial bombing raids by the 
United States blurred the 
boundaries between Cambodia and 
Vietnam.  In 1970 in a bloodless 
coup, the Khmer Rouge Republic 
was formed with close ties to the 
United States.  Once the United States withdrew support from the Khmer Rouge 
Republic the communist contingent in Kampuchea became the dominant force 
and began a restructuring of the country’s social system (Williams 449). Under 
the leadership of the dictator Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge wanted to “rid the 
country of those deemed not borisot (pure).  These included the educated; those 
“tainted” by anything of “heredity enemies, especially the Vietnam and other 
ethnic minorities (persons of Chinese, Thai, or Lao ancestry, as well as the 
Muslim” (Waller 169).  Pol Pot’s goal and those of the new Khmer Rouge 
Republic was to return Cambodia to an agrarian society free of foreign 
intervention.  
Identifying and classifying the enemies of the state required a targeted 
group.  The Khmer Rouge distinguished between,“ new people’ –those who 
resided in the towns and cities and comprising foreign sympathizers, the 
intellectuals, teachers, middle class and members of the Khmer Republic- and 
“base people’ those that had resided in the country-side during the 1970-75 
conflict” (Williams 449) . The “new people” were forced to live in deplorable 
Figure 3  Cambodian dead 
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conditions and forced labor.  The new regime was indiscriminate in their killings.  
The first to be executed were those from the social class of intellects, teachers, 
religious groups, ethnic minorities and former military and civilian leaders.  Many 
people were just simply tortured and then eventually disappeared.   
The next genocide occurred in Central Africa. In 1994 the Hutus in 
Rwanda killed 800,000 Tutsis and Tutsi sympathizers in a 100 day period.  The 
public reason for the Tutsi annihilation for the War in Rwanda was racial and 
ethnic rivalry culminating with civil war.  Rwanda has a long history of racial 
divide and violence.  Under Belgian colonist rule, the minority Tutsi ethnic group 
was singled out to become the leaders by the Belgium authorities.  Even though 
the Tutsis were the minority under the Germans and eventually the Belgium 
colonization, they were placed into a position of authority to carry out the wishes 
of the European powers.  The Belgians issued ethnic identification cards to the 
Hutu, Tutsi’s and the Twa (Batwa Pygmy) tribes, in essence developing a caste 
system in Rwanda.  As part of the Arusha Accords in 1992 the identification 
cards were to be eliminated and replaced with identification cards that were 
never issued.  The identification cards were used by the Hutu to identify and kill 
Tutsis.      
The violent struggles in Rwanda initially began in 1955 to 1957, bringing 
about the publication of the Hutu Manifesto declaring their right to govern 
Rwanda which included The Hutu Ten Commandments calling for Hutu majority 
rule.  The Hutu Manifesto demanded the end of Tutsi dominance and spread the 
idea that Tutsis were not even Rwandans and only inhabited Rwanda in recent 
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memory. The Hutu saw the future of Rwanda as being Hutu- led and the Tutsi 
saw it as maintaining Tutsi long tenured leadership and the belief by some, “that 
the Hutu were by their very nature subservient” (Melvern 6).   According to 
Melvern, “The United Nations also considered the problems in Rwanda a “racial 
divide.”  When the Hutu Manifesto was published, the UN sent a commission to 
Rwanda and claimed there was little hope for the “reapproachment between the 
races” and called upon the Belgians to emancipate the down-trodden Hutus 
(Melvern 6).  In 1990 a magazine called the Kangura was established following 
the Rwandan Patriotic Front attacked Rwanda (RPF) and in response to their 
magazine Kanguka which meant “wake up”.  In Kinyarwanda, the native 
language of Rwanda, Kangura means “wake others up”.   
 
Figure 4 Rwandan orphans 
The magazine spread brutal hatred aimed at the Tutsi population and 
introduced the Hutu Ten Commandments.  It continued to publish right up to the 
start of the genocide. 
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Table 3.  Hutu Ten Commandments 
1.      Every Hutu male should know that Tutsi women, wherever they may be, 
are working in the pay of their Tutsi ethnic group. Consequently, shall be deemed 
a traitor: 
-          Any Hutu male who marries a Tutsi woman; 
-          Any Hutu male who keeps a Tutsi concubine; 
-          Any Hutu male who makes a Tutsi woman his secretary or protégée. 
2.      Every Hutu male must know that our Hutu daughters are more dignified and 
conscientious in their role of woman, wife or mother. Are they not pretty, good 
secretaries and more honest! 
3.      Hutu women, be vigilant and bring your husbands, brothers and sons back 
to their senses. 
4.      Every Hutu male must know that all Tutsi are dishonest in their business 
dealings. They are only seeking their ethnic supremacy. “Time will tell.” Shall be 
considered a traitor, any Hutu male: 
-          who enters into a business partnership with Tutsis; 
-          who invests his money or State money in a Tutsi company; 
-          who lends to, or borrows from, a Tutsi; 
-          who grants business favors to Tutsis (granting of important licenses, bank 
loans, building plots, public tenders...) is a traitor. 
5.      Strategic positions in the political, administrative, economic, military and 
security domain should, to a large extent, be entrusted to Hutus. 
6.      In the education sector (pupils, students, teachers) must be in the majority 
Hutu. 
7.      The Rwandan Armed Forces should be exclusively Hutu. That is the lesson 
we learned from the October 1990 war. No soldier must marry a Tutsi woman. 
8.      Hutus must cease having pity for the Tutsi. 
9.      The Hutu male, wherever he may be, must be united, in solidarity and be 
concerned about the fate of their Hutu brothers; 
-          The Hutu at home and abroad must constantly seek friends and allies for 
the Hutu Cause, beginning with our Bantu brothers; 
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-          They must constantly counteract Tutsi propaganda; 
-          The Hutu must be firm and vigilant towards their common Tutsi enemy. 
10.  The 1959 social revolution, the 1961 referendum and the Hutu ideology must 
be taught to Hutus at all levels. Every Hutu must propagate the present ideology 
widely. Any Hutu who persecutes his Hutu brother for having read, disseminated 
and taught this ideology shall be deemed a traitor. (Thompson 279-281)  
 
In 1959 thousands of people were killed when the Belgians began a power 
shift from Tutsi leadership to Hutu leadership.  The UN sent a fact finding mission 
to assess the situation and reported that racism abounded and bordered on 
“Nazism against the Tutsi minority” and the Rwandan government and the 
Belgians were to blame (Melvern 7).  In 1990 the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), 
composed of deported and fleeing Tutsis, attacked Rwanda from Uganda to end 
the totalitarianism under the rule of President Habyarimana.  The fear of this 
“internal” enemy gave the new Hutu government the method to round up 
suspected Tutsis “accomplices.”  Prior to President Habyarimana’s death, “Lists 
had already been prepared; educated Tutsis, prosperous Tutsis, and Tutsis who 
traveled abroad were among the first to be arrested” (Gourevitch 83).  
 After the death of President Habyarimana in 1994 in a plane crash, any 
semblance of an organized government disappeared.  The radical Hutus began 
their planned and systematic annihilation of the moderate Hutus and anyone 
Tutsi.  The Hutu majority called upon all Hutus to eliminate the inyenze 
(cockroaches) along with a reward for participation as if were a contest 
(Bhavnani 656).  In the end 800,000 were slaughtered before the present uneasy 
peace.  
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Chapter 2: Psychology of Genocide 
 
Perpetrators 
 
The common denominator in all genocides, and particularly the four being 
discussed, is the emergence of perpetrators. Their reasons may vary, but the 
end result is the same; they control events leading up to and including the 
formation and execution of genocide.  The answer lies in both the person and the 
situation.  A theoretical estimate of the percentage of authoritarians within a 
population is 15 to 20 percent (Baum 119). What kind of person becomes a 
perpetrator and why?  How does a leader of this perpetration wield so much 
control over a society that follows orders so obscene, they would take part in 
mass murder or a least help in the violence of genocide, whether by consent or 
by force.  There are many reasons attributed to one becoming a perpetrator.  
Social psychologist Ervin Staub suggests “to consider one’s orientation to 
authority as a predisposition of ordinary people who become perpetrators” (Staub 
75). 
 According to historian Michael Mann, a third of the Nazis had records of 
prewar extremist activity. These obedient servants had been nurtured in an 
environment of structure and a hierarchical society.  These dutiful perpetrators 
are historically accustomed to accepting orders and giving orders, depending on 
the status within the hierarchy.  Times of crisis, such as the death of moderate 
Rwandan President Habyarimana, can be the catalyst to push the predisposed 
perpetrators toward violence.  A crisis “can be very unsettling and disorienting for 
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individuals and may result in loss of group pride, an escalation of fear, frustration 
of needs and wants, confusion regarding personal identity and increase in 
prejudice” (Staub 1989 249).   
The Turks dealing with loss of the Balkans created fear that another 
Christian group, much like the Balkan countries, would further destroy or erode 
the Turkish Empire.  The Germans were dealing with the humiliation after World 
War I and the economic calamity it created. Khmer Rouge distain for foreign 
control of their country and the Rwandan Hutus perceived loss of power.  These 
scenarios cause uncertainty, fear and stress. The upheaval creates a void of 
confidence in the current government and in leadership and a lack of pride in the 
disheartened population themselves and their culture.  The void can and does 
become occupied by a leader who takes charge and rallies the people to a sense 
of national pride, which in turn brings the people together in a fervent nationalistic 
group.  To accomplish this, a common enemy must be found, identified and 
labeled as a threat to the state and be found responsible for all of the problems 
besieging the country.    
Daniel Goldhagen, an Associate of Harvard University’s Minda de 
Gunzburg Center for European Studies, produced three questions in his study of 
perpetrators during the Holocaust.  Did the perpetrators of the Holocaust kill 
willingly?  If so, what motivated them to kill and brutalize Jews?  How was this 
motivation provoked?   He began his study by evaluating three institutions of 
killing; work camps, police battalions and death marches.  The actions of the 
28 
 
 
 
 
perpetrators chronicled deeds and highlighted their general voluntarism, 
enthusiasm, and cruelty in carrying out their assigned or self-appointed tasks.   
The results of the study provided, indicate four perpetrator actions (Table 
1) common among the perpetrators during the Holocaust (Goldhagen 376). Many 
of the German perpetrators methodically and enthusiastically carried out their 
orders to kill Jews, and in some cases took it upon themselves to kill Jews when 
they were not ordered to do so.  “Each of the four types of action was an 
ordinary, typical, even a regularly occurring constituent feature of the 
perpetrators’ treatment of Jews” (Goldhagen 376). In Table 4, the actions take 
into consideration whether a German acted by completing a mission or order and 
the actions taken was strictly on his or her own accord.  Perpetrators carried out 
their orders blindly, with zeal, dedication and inventiveness. This study, 
particularly of police battalions, establishes the Germans’ opportunities to extract 
themselves from killing operations rendering “following orders” a more complex 
psychological and motivational problem.  The torture and suffering appears to be 
carried out by the captors for no other reason than pleasure.  The immense 
suffering and torture in the work camps was ironic in that it was in direct conflict 
with the work camp’s assigned purpose. 
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Table 4.  The perpetrator’s actions 
Ordered by Authority 
    Yes    No 
 
 Yes 
Cruelty 
 No 
  
 
 
 The authoritarian reign of organized suffering was not only issued by the 
most senior officer; junior officers and non-commissioned officers organized their 
own men to torture Jews (Goldhagen 377).   
 
A Culture of Violence 
 
In a culture of violence there is usually a pattern of using aggression as a 
normal response to problem solving.  There also exists a belief of superiority and 
an aggressive nature toward a perceived threat.  Conversely, the major 
genocides of the twentieth century were all committed by or within states with a, 
“history of aggressive conflict and war. Cultures that glorify violence (e.g. military 
parades, heroic media) are at great risk for perpetuating many forms of violence” 
(Woolf 102).  A culture of violence arises in countries that use aggression as a 
Organized & 
“Structured” Cruelty 
“Excesses” 
Such as Torture 
Killing and Individual 
Killings 
“Acts of Initiative” 
Such as Individually 
Initiated Killings 
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way to resolve differences or to eliminate a perceived threat with little 
consequence for their actions and the idea that their race, ethnicity or religion 
exhibits intolerance of diversity (Woolf 101).   
The Turk’s brutal wars of conquest and the ideology of authority over all 
non-Muslims by holding them in “infidel” status created an atmosphere of 
authority and paved the way for the Armenians to be slaughtered for no other 
reason than to eliminate those who were considered beneath them. You need to 
only look back at World War I for Germany’s history of aggression and violence. 
Germany’s perceived threat from the Jews gave the Germans all they needed to 
marginalize and then exterminates the Jews. This also holds true for Hutus with 
their record of indignation and lack of respect for the Tutsis dating back to their 
Belgian colonial period. 
One thing appears to be a constant for the perpetrators and victims of the 
genocides in the twentieth century is the atmosphere of “ aggression and 
violence that are so much a part of everyday life that they are often assumed to 
be the natural order of life” (Woolf 102).  The United States’ invasion of the 
sovereign state of Afghanistan, were a reaction to the attack on 9/11 on U.S. soil 
and the threat of more violence from Al Qaeda.  The invasion of Iraq, without 
United Nations approval, was to eliminate a perceived threat of an attack from 
Iraq using weapons of mass destruction.  The United States propensity for using 
violence to resolve conflict gives the international community’s a view of the U. S. 
as a warrior nation.   Germany, Turkey, Cambodia and Rwanda have a long-
standing history of aggression and lack of cohesive diversity.   Genocides of the 
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twentieth century have “a culture of cruelty buttressed by professional 
socialization, binding factors of the group, and the merger of role and person 
envelops perpetrators in a social context that encourages and rewards 
extraordinary evil” (Woolf 102).   
 
Authoritarian Personality 
While authority is necessary in a group society, too much obedience lends 
itself to blind loyalty, making an individual less apt to oppose those in higher 
authority and carry out their murder assignments.  German Philosopher Theodor 
Adorno, working at the Frankfurt School of critical theory, developed what is 
called The Authoritarian Personality.  His work at the Frankfurt school shows a 
connection between “those who disliked Jews tended to dislike other ethnic 
minority, racial and religious groups such as well (Mormon, Hispanics, African-
Americans gays)” (Baum 118).  Along with his colleagues, Adorno found a trend 
of prejudicial attitudes.  They determined prejudiced people were, “children of 
dominating fathers and punitive mothers who engaged in unusually harsh child-
rearing practices” (Waller 77).   
To establish obedience, parents would use parental love as a device to 
create obedience by giving affection as a reward for good behavior.  This 
dependency on the parents creates fear and as they grow older become more 
submissive to those with power (Waller 78). The results of Adorno and his 
colleague’s study, was the identification of nine factors leading to an authoritarian 
personality resulting from a test called the Fascism or F-scale (Table 6).  The F-
32 
 
 
 
 
scale shows individuals who exhibit signs of a strong obedience toward authority 
and aggressive toward others held similar traits (Baum 118).   
Adorno’s first test subjects were selected from the student population at 
the University of California for specific reasons (Table 5). First, he was convinced 
that college students had an opinion and that all students understood the 
questions and the same responses had uniform implications.  He also chose 
them because, “college students form one group that is relatively quite 
homogeneous with respect to factors that might be expected to influence 
ideology” (Adorno 18).  Non-college subjects were selected who best 
represented a wide variation of the adult American.  The goal was to, “examine 
people who possessed in different degrees as many as possible of the 
sociological variables presumed to be relevant to the study-political, religious, 
occupational, income, and social group memberships” (Adorno 20).  
Some groups were selected, such as veterans, service clubs, women’s 
clubs, because of their struggles centering on societal discrimination.  Other 
groups were chosen for intensive study because, “they presented extreme 
manifestations of the personality variables deemed most crucial for the 
potentially antidemocratic individual’ e.g., prison inmates, psychiatric patients” 
(Adorno 22).  Most of the subjects for the test came from the middle class. One 
group that was specifically excluded was ones with a majority of minorities.  It 
was not because, “the ideological trends in minority groups were considered not 
important; it was rather that their investigation involved special problems which 
lay outside the scope of the present” (Adorno 23).   
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Table 5.  Groups from Whom Questionnaires were collected 
 # of Cases 
Form 78 (January to May, 1945) 
University of California  
 
     Public Speaking Class Women 140 
     Public Speaking Class Men 52 
     Extension Psychology Class (adult women) 40 
     Professional Women (Public school teachers, social workers 
(SF area) 
63 
     Total 295 
  
Form 60 (Summer, 1945) 
University of Oregon 
 
     Student Women 47 
     University of California and Oregon Student Women 54 
     University of Oregon and California Student Men 57 
     Oregon Service club Men (Kiwanis, Lions, Rotary) 68 
     Oregon Service Club Men * 60 
     Total 287 
  
A.  Forms 45 and 40 November, 1945, to June, 1946) 
 
     University of California Extension Testing Class (adult women) 59 
     Psychiatric Clinic Patients (men and women) ( Langley Porter 
Clinic                          of the University of California) 
121 
     San Quentin State Prison Inmates (men) 110 
Total 243 
  
B.  Both Forms 45 and 40 
 
     Alameda School for Merchant marine Officers (men) 343 
     U.S. Employment Service Veterans (men) 106 
     Total 449 
  
D.  Form 40 Working-Class Women: 
 
     California Labor School 19 
     United Electrical Workers Union (C.I.O.) 8 
     Office Workers 11 
     Longshoremen & Warehousemen (I.L.W:U.) (new members) 10 
     Federal Housing Project Workers 5 
     Total 53 
  
Working-Class Men:  
California Labor School  
     United Electrical Workers Union (C.I.O.)       12 
 
34 
 
 
 
 
 
Of the fourteen groups taking Form 40-65, the San Quentin Inmates 
obtained the highest mean score.  This mean is significantly different form that of 
the next highest scoring group, the Working Class Men.  Between the San 
Quentin group and the lowest scoring group of men the difference is very 
marked.  In view of all that has been written concerning the close affinity of 
criminality and fascism, these results should not be surprising.  The mean F 
score shows very little distinction between Working-class Men and Service Club 
Men.  This “will come as a surprise only to those who have become accustomed 
to explaining all important differences in social attitudes on the basis of 
socioeconomic group membership, and who look to the working man as the main 
carrier of liberal ideas” (Adorno 268).    
Adorno has reason to believe that the authoritarian structures with which 
we are concerned would be any less well developed in the working class than in 
other segments of the populations. For that matter the extremely high scoring 
San Quentin Inmates are a very large segment of the working class, and their 
outlook is depended upon their background as well as the reason they are in 
prison. The , “differences among the present groups of men depend more upon 
the factor of contact with liberal organizations and liberal thought than upon 
socioeconomic group membership” (Adorno 268).   
 
 
 
35 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.  Fascism or F-scale 
Conventionalism Rigid adherences to conventional values 
Submission Uncritical attitude towards their own group’s 
idealized moral authority 
Aggression Punishment for those who violate convention 
Anti-Intraception Intolerance of tender-mindedness 
Superstition & Stereotypy Rigid categories 
Power and Toughness Preoccupation with power and dominance, 
strength/weakness 
Destruction and Cynicism General hostility 
Projectivity Placing their sexual and aggressive impulses onto 
others 
 
Sex Preoccupation with sexuality and morals of others 
  
  In 1981 Canadian Psychologist Bob Altemeyer developed a more 
accurate measurement to define authoritarianism.  He called this measurement 
Right-Wing Authoritarian (RWA) scale.  Using individuals scoring high on the 
Social Dominance Orientation (SDO) scale he found many common attributes.  
The SDO person is usually the one that is the authoritarian leader, while the 
RWA is the follower of the SDO.  Altemeyer’s results show that only three 
elements are truly common in the RWA’s, conventionalism, authoritarian 
submission, and authoritarian aggression.  The study also revealed those who 
score high in these areas are the most discriminatory people in society 
(Altemeyer 1).   
Right Wing Authoritarians seem to combine the worst elements of each 
kind of personality, being power-hungry, manipulative, lacking morals and lack of 
belief in equality.  They are usually very religious, ethnocentric and dogmatic, as 
right-wing authoritarians tend to be.  Right-wing authoritarians were highly likely 
to be prejudiced.  These “people are relatively submissive to those they consider 
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the established authorities, aggressive when they believe that authorities 
sanction the aggression (Passini 52).  Social dominators intend to proceed with 
relatively little moral restraint” (Altemeyer 4).   
 
Conventionalism 
 
 Steven Baum, a noted Lecturer in the Department of Psychology at the 
University of New Mexico, attributes social conformity as a very significant 
element of authoritarianism. For an authoritarian leader like Adolf Hitler, who did 
not have an internal mechanism to differentiate right from wrong, social 
conformity would be paramount for him to have others follow is leadership, as a 
way to relieve undue anxiety.   Steve Baum writes, “Identity and feeling and 
needs must be laid out and described in black-and-white terms.  Anything other 
than traditional conventional and cognitively simple thinking creates even more 
anxiety in a person with the most limited coping skills” (Baum 124-125).  To 
remove this anxiety, “fascist thinking creates a certainty and hence a sense of 
safety, security and pleasure in having all loose ends tied down, slowly but surely 
its relentless quest for power and certainty destroys everything that stands in its 
way and eventually its own life as well” (Charny 4).  In examining the 
psychological makeup “of White supremacists like the Ku Klux Klan, many were 
found to be fearful not of Blacks and Jews, but of the unknown” (Baum 124-125). 
 
Submission to Authority 
 
 Perpetrators, who submit to authority, do so with passion and reverence. 
They have a pattern of showing tendencies toward fundamental religious ideals 
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conservative in nature, and lend themselves to support tradition.  This doesn’t 
mean all perpetrators have to be are fundamentalist.  The extreme sense of 
submission to a father-like figure may have evolved from living in an autocratic 
family where punishment was extreme and abusive.  “Authority within the family 
generally translates to paternalistic family cultures. And such authority translates 
from cultural group to the culture at large” (Baum 126).   
When religion “stops people from thinking about the larger questions, 
when it invokes infallibility and loyalty and avoids criticism, when it criticizes the 
followers for not believing enough, when it ask for full submission-then the cult is 
placed into religious culture and abuse occurs” (Baum 126).  In some cases, 
religion has narrowed down choices for the follower to either right or wrong. This 
type of thinking in conjunction with selective information is a way to keep the 
culture closed-minded.  In most groups, “ethnocentrism, xenophobia and a 
proclivity toward social dominance translate to fear and loathing of outsiders” 
(Baum 128). Before the genocide in Armenia started, Islamic fundamentalist 
separated the Christians from the Muslim population by classing them as 
“infidels” thus developing a fundamentalist closed minded society.  The name, 
“Islam means submission to Allah.  Submission to God and subjugation of 
nonbelievers are important components of that religion.  One must submit and 
not question the religious law and practices which vary from Muslim nation to 
Muslim nation” (Baum 129). 
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Obedience 
 
Obedience is required in a society to maintain order.  When the obedience 
becomes blinded and is directed to a prejudiced authority, bad things can 
happen.  In the 1960’s Stanley Milgram, a psychologist at Yale University, 
conducted experiments to determine why individuals were obedient to a higher 
authority even though the orders they gave were counter to their moral values.  
While volunteering as a teacher they were given orders from the experimenter 
using remote feedback to administer shocks progressively for wrong answers to 
a learner (actor) who was located behind a wall. Using 40 volunteers, 26 followed 
the experimenter’s orders and reached the maximum setting on the “shock” 
generator three times before the experimenter halted the test.  Milgram was 
trying to find out if people would defy authority when the act of obedience was 
contrary to the teacher’s moral belief.  What he found after the experiment was a 
number of the volunteers appeared to remain calm while others showed signs of 
relief or regret, but nearly all complied (Milgram 33).  While the results of the test 
noted the volunteers experienced stress “despite the fact that many protest to the 
experimenter, a substantial proportion continued to the last shock on the 
generator” (Milgram 5).   
Again, using 40 subjects, Milgram altered the conditions of the experiment 
to bring the victim physically closer to the volunteer.  He varied the experiment 
(2) only this time he used Voice-Feedback so the victim’s vocal responses to the 
shocks could be heard by the volunteer.  In experiment 3, he used Proximity 
conditions, placing the victim in the room with the volunteer.  In experiment 4, 
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using Touch Proximity, the victim would still be in the room with the volunteer but 
they would only be shocked when the victim’s hand rested on a shock plate. At 
150 volts the victim refused to place their hand on the plate and the volunteer 
was directed to hold their hand down.  On a scale of 1 to 30, 30 being the most 
severe shock, Milgram found the following to be true: 
 
Table 7.  Maximum Shocks Administered in Experiments 1, 2, 3, and 4 
Shock level Experiment  1 
  
Experiment 2 Experiment 3 Experiment 4 
Mean 
maximum 
shock level 
27.0 24.53 20.80 17.88 
Percentage 
obedient 
subjects 
65% 62.5% 40.0% 30.0% 
 
Looking at these results, the more removed from a subject the more likely 
the volunteer would follow the orders of the experimenters.  As the volunteer 
moves closer in proximity to the victim, obedience seems to wane.  The 
surprising element of these experiments is when the conditions require very 
close proximity, in the case of experiment 4, obedience drops significantly more 
than then did in experiments in experiments 1 and 2.  The most surprising and 
disappointing aspect is when the volunteer reached experiment 4, requiring a 
physical requirement to shock the victim, 30% continued to shock their victim, 
albeit at a lower shock level (Milgram 54).   
Milgram altered the conditions by moving the experiment from the Yale lab 
to an austere location off campus to see if the new environment would reduce the 
acceptance level of obedience.  In this experiment (5) he used the Voice-
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Feedback method like in experiment 2 with one difference (Milgram 55).  He 
would have the victim say,  
In the preliminary interview in front of the volunteer that he had, 
“When I was at the V.A. Westhaven Clinic Hospital, a few years 
ago, they detected a slight heart condition.  Nothing serious, but are 
these shocks dangerous?  The experimenter replies in a confident, 
somewhat dismissive tone that although the shocks may be painful, 
they cause no permanent tissue damage, then proceeds with the 
experimental routines. (Milgram 56) 
 
 These new guidelines would persist through experiments 5 through 11.  In 
experiment 6 he changed the type of people, taking in to consideration, 
personality.  Not using an experimenter who was a, “somewhat dry, hard, 
technical-looking man.  The victim in contrast was soft, avuncular, and 
innocuous” (Milgram 58).  In the next group of experiments he inverted the 
personalities of the victim and experimenter.  In experiment 7, the volunteer 
would play the role more aligned with the experimenter.   
 
Table 8.  Maximum Shocks Administered in Experiments 5-11 
 
Verbal 
Designa
tion & 
voltage 
level 
 
Experim
ent 5 
Experim
ent 6 
Experim
ent 7 
Experim
ent 8 
Experim
ent 9 
Experim
ent 10 
Experim
ent 11 
Mean 
max 
shock 
level 
24.55 22.20 18.15 24.73 21.40 20.95 5.50 
Percent
age 
obedient 
subjects 
65.0% 50.0% 20.5% 65.0% 40.0% 47.5% 2.5% 
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 The volunteers seemed to be more concerned about how they were doing 
in the eyes of the experimenter, making them more insensitive to the victim and, 
“lead us to believe that alterations in the relationship between subject and 
experimenter would have important consequences for obedience” (Milgram 59).  
An added twist to experiment 7 required the experimenter to leave the room and 
give his orders by telephone.  The level of obedience was greatly reduced when 
the experimenter was located out of the area.  He also noted that when the 
experimenter was not present, the volunteer would not increase the shock level 
as instructed.  When the experimenter returned the volunteer would in most 
cases resume being obedient to the experimenters orders.  Adherence to a, 
“destructive a command was in some degree dependent on the proximal 
relations between authority and subject, and any theory of obedience must take 
into account of this fact” (Milgram 62). 
 Unlike the previous experiments, experiment 8 consisted of 40 females.  
Women are considered less aggressive but more obedient; on previous test of 
obedience.  The level of obedience shows women are no different than men in 
the experiment, with the exception of their level of struggle in shocking the victim.  
In experiment 9 the victim put a caveat on his contract to perform the experiment.  
His condition is that due to having a heart condition, the experiment will be halted 
upon his request.  The experimenter begrudgingly agreed.  When the experiment 
was conducted and the victim said to stop the majority brought up the contract 
condition, but 40% continued on with the shocks based on the experimenter’s 
orders.  Even with the contract condition of stopping when the victim said he 
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wanted to halt the experiment, and knowing that if he continued, the teacher, 
they continued.  “This is to be compared with the 20 subjects who continued to 
obey in the relevant control, condition 6.  There is some increment in 
disobedience, but it could easily represent a chance variation” (Milgram 66).    
 To evaluate other variations, Milgram used Institutional Context in 
evaluating his volunteers.  Using the same parameters as the previous 
experiments, Milgram moved the experiment to Bridgeport, a blue collar oriented 
city, and advertised without using Yale as the source.  The experiment was 
conducted in an ascetic office building with minimal comforts.  During the 
interview process credibility of the company was a concern and the reasons for 
the experiment. The experiment without the highly respected name of Yale 
showed a slightly lower tension than those conducted at Yale (Milgram 68). 
 Experiment 10 gave the volunteer the authority to make the selection of 
shock administered, on the assumption that who gives the command is 
irrelevant.  They were told they were allowed to use any level they desire, 
including combinations of levels including the maximum level.  Of the volunteers, 
“Three subjects limited their shocks to the very lowest on the board, 28 went no 
higher than the first indication of discomfort, and 38 did not go beyond the point 
where the victim vehemently protested” (Milgram 72).   So people are most likely 
to obey if the orders are given “within some sort of institutional structure” 
(Milgram 71) and are less likely to obey if they are the ones controlling the 
situation and given the ability to choose punishment.  
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 Based on the conclusions of the experiments, why people act to orders 
when alone indicates something about human nature.  Why men shock at the 
highest level when directed to do so, “needs to be explained by the 
transformation of behavior that comes about through obedience to orders” 
(Milgram 72).  At Nuremburg Rudolf Hess, Auschwitz camp commander, 
testified, “Adolf Eichmann “was not obsessed with the extermination of the Jew… 
but he was obsessed with ‘orders” (Weinert 186).  Though Milgram’s 
experimenters gave the orders, the actual physical perpetrators are the 
volunteers giving the shock.  Much like the average Hutu killing Tutsis, the Khmer 
Rouge soldiers slaughtering their own people, Muslims in Turkey eliminating 
Christians, the perpetrator doing the killing was more likely to kill due to 
obedience to orders.  The axiom “I was just following orders” cannot release the 
individual from being the instrument from which the orders from the authorities’ 
orders are carried but Milgram’s experiments at least show us how it can occur.  
If the killers in Cambodia and Rwanda and Uganda emerged 
suddenly, as it were, like a massive tsunami that changes the face 
of the civilization it strikes, they just as suddenly dispersed, 
blending back into the societies from which they sprung. They, as 
doers of the nasty deeds, are the silent killers, the ones who truly 
are worse than Hitler-for they did not plan, did no envision, did not 
administer, did not question; they simply did with impunity. (Weinert 
187) 
 
 This same principle could be applied to any member of the United States 
military.   United States Federal law requires anyone who enlists or re-enlists into 
military service to take an enlistment oath.  The oath of enlistment must be 
presided over by a commissioned officer. 
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Oath of Enlistment 
"I, _____, do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the 
Constitution of the United States against all enemies, foreign and domestic; that I 
will bear true faith and allegiance to the same; and that I will obey the orders of 
the President of the United States and the orders of the officers appointed over 
me, according to regulations and the Uniform Code of Military Justice. So help 
me God.” (Title 10, US Code 502- sec 502) 
Military training regiments’ mission is to teach soldiers how to respond to 
orders automatically with little or no hesitation. Criminal liability for obedience to 
orders is exempted from international law or by a country’s military code unless 
the order is “manifestly illegal.” Mark Osiel, Professor at The University of Iowa, 
College of Law writes, the law is “now generally understood to require that 
soldiers resolve all doubts about the legality of a superior’s orders in favor of 
obedience.  It therefore excuses compliance with an illegal order unless the 
illegality-as with flagrant atrocities-would be immediately obvious to anyone on its 
face” (Osiel 5).  
Members of the United States Armed Services fall under the governance 
of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ).  The UCMJ is criminal law 
applicable to all military members worldwide.  Obedience to orders from a 
superior is tantamount to good order and discipline in the U.S. military.  Failure to 
obey orders can carry severe penalties up to and including death if the failure to 
follow orders transpires during a time of war.  The regulations in the UCMJ 
governing obedience to orders are; 
UCMJ-SEC 892. ART. 92. FAILURE TO OBEY ORDER OR REGULATION  
Any person subject to this chapter who--  
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(1) Violates or fails to obey any lawful general order or regulation;  
(2) Having knowledge of any other lawful order issued by any member of the 
armed forces, which it is his duty to obey, fails to obey the order; or is derelict in 
the performance of his duties 
UCMJ-SEC 893. ART. 93. CRUELTY AND MALTREATMENT  
Any person subject to this chapter who is guilty of cruelty toward, or oppression 
or maltreatment of, any person subject to his orders shall be punished as a court-
martial may direct.  
 If a soldier is given an order and fails to carry it out, Article 92 would apply.  
If he carries out an order later determined to be “manifestly illegal”, then Article 
93 would apply.  This places a soldier in a combat situation, is ordered to do 
something while under duress, with degradation of their cognitive skills, the 
responsibility of determining if the order is legal. Military personnel are bound by 
law to follow the orders of their superiors and defend ‘against all enemies, foreign 
and domestic.  The Turks found the Armenians, the Germans the Jews, the 
Khmer Rouge the “new people” and the Hutus the Tutsis as their domestic 
enemies.  
Ethnocentrism 
 
  The technical name for ethnocentrism “is a view of things in which one’s 
own group is the center of everything, and all others are scaled and rated with 
reference to it.  Each group, “nourishes its own pride and vanity, boasts itself 
superior, exalts its own divinities, and looks with contempt on outsiders” (Waller 
154).  Children as young as six or seven already have identified a strong 
penchant for their own ethnic group.  Experimenters,” have noted the concept of 
“us and them” carry positive emotional significance that is activated automatically 
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and unconsciously” (Rutherford 191).  When identified with a group people have 
an easier time exaggerating difference between the group they belong to and 
other “different groups” (Waller 155).  Ethnocentrism is the adaptation universal 
adaptation and the second is xenophobia. 
 
Xenophobia 
 
Ethnocentrism changes into xenophobia, which is the hatred or fear of 
foreigners or strangers or of their politics or culture.  This fear leads to people of 
like attitudes to form groups for protection, which in turn, exacerbates the phobia.  
It can even be said that in forming bonds we deepen fissures.  Defining, “what 
the in-group is also requires defining what it is not.  We are what we are because 
they are not what we are (Waller 155).  On a much larger societal level, 
governments, propaganda and militaries can easily summon and heighten our 
capacities for ethnocentrism and xenophobia.   
At the extreme, “these capacities may even translate into a genocidal 
imperative as they are used to forge in-group solidarity and undermine the 
normal inhibitions against killing out-group strangers” (Waller 156).  Matt Ridley 
“argues that humans have evolved natures with a host of social instincts.  On the 
positive side, these social instincts equip us “with predispositions to learn how to 
cooperate, to discriminate the trustworthy from the treacherous” (Ridley 155).  
The negative is that the social predispositions can cause ethnocentric distrust 
and can be the basis for an atmosphere of association with one’s own group and 
hostility toward other groups. 
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  Anthropologist Michael Ghiglieri Writes: “xenophobia and ethnocentrism 
are not just essential ingredients to war.  Because they instinctively tell men 
precisely whom to bond with, versus whom to fight against, they are the most 
dangerously manipulative facets of war psychology that promote genocide.  
Indeed, genocide itself has become a potent force in human evolution” (Ghiglieri 
211). 
  To sum it up we have an instinctive propensity to reach out to what we 
are acquainted with and view those that are not the same as dangerous, and in 
all probability to be avoided.  “More than two hundred social psychological 
experiments have confirmed the intimate connection between familiarity and 
fondness” (Waller 156).  This general inclination is the basis for the behavioral 
expressions of ethnocentrism and xenophobia. Ethnic clashes “have to some 
degree become a basic feature in many modern societies.  Behind any conflict, 
you are sure to find racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia or a related 
intolerance” (Waller 156).   
  
Desire for Social Dominance 
 
One of the most powerful motivating forces in animals is the desire for 
social dominance. This desire, leading to differences in rank and status, can be 
defined as the set of sustained aggressive-submissive relations among a group 
of animals.  These relations form a hierarchical structure, commonly called 
dominance.  Other times, however, our evolved desire for social dominance 
means that we have an inclination to respond to certain kinds of situations 
aggressively, even violently, to get our way.  Violence works as a means of 
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getting some contested resource by increasing the cost of that resource to 
another individual.  Moreover, once an organism gets past initial inhibitions 
against aggressive and violent behavior, such behavior rapidly escalates and 
increases over time and seems, in part, to become self-reinforcing.   
In short, aggression and violence often result from our desire for social 
dominance (Waller 158). This desire for social dominance is, “Perhaps driven by 
primal forces of herd protection, all groups are constitutionally ethnocentric, 
xenophobic, and prone to social dominance.  No matter what the size or shape of 
the group, all group members remain perpetually threatened and stand vigilant 
pending attacks from outsiders” (Baum 38).   
As long as people feed into their social group identity, as long as they 
believe they represent their group in the world, as long as they remain unable to 
distinguish between personal and social identities then ethnocentrism and 
xenophobia continues.  “Little did I know, “says former Nazi Bruno Manz, “that 
collective pride was a narcotic for the mentally homeless” (Baum 222).  Michael 
Ignatieff, analyzing the Serbian conflict, states “When people think of themselves 
as patriots’ first, individuals second, they have embarked on a path of ethical 
abdication” (Baum 222). 
 
De-individuation 
 
De-individualism is the loss of a person's sense of individuality and refers 
to a, “state of relative anonymity in which a person cannot be identified as a 
particular individual, but only as a group member” (Waller 216).  The concept 
includes a loss of individual identify with less emphasis on individual norms and 
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replaced by social norms associated with a definite group norm.  These are, 
“conditions that confer anonymity and increase the likelihood of extraordinary evil 
as people partially lose awareness of themselves as individuals and cease to 
evaluate their own actions thoughtfully” (Waller 216).  When having to face 
hardship alone, some find security and sympathy from organization like church, 
addiction support groups and to dangerous hate groups. Group dynamics can 
exacerbate an individual’s ideas whether they are positive or negative (Waller 
218).  In groups, “people do many things they would never do alone, for instance 
decision -  making goes awry as social forces take over logic, “ group think””  and 
confirmation bias, and create errors such as those that occurred in the Watergate 
scandal” (Baum 38).   
Robert I. Watson Jr., a Harvard anthropologist, theorized that groups that 
changed their appearance before going to war by wearing mask, shaving their 
heads or painting their face would be more aggressive against their victims- more 
likely to kill, torture, or mutilate them- than would groups that did not change their 
appearance (Waller 217). The results of his research clearly reveal an important 
connection between the process of de-individuation and aggression in war.  Of 
those cultures that were reported to go through de-individuating process before 
entering into battle, 80 percent were coded as extremely aggressive in warfare.   
In a similar manner social psychologist, Brian Mullen, content-analyzed 
newspaper accounts of sixty lynching’s committed in the United States between 
1899 and 1946 and found there was greater cruelty and ferocity in killing their 
victims when they were in a mob (Waller 217). 
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De-individuation is especially relevant to incidents of mass killing and 
genocide where the perpetrators are members of a military or paramilitary 
organization; all clad in like uniforms and appear less identifiable.  De-
individuation does not require a person to belong to an organization to be a factor 
in the act of committing atrocities.  Hiding in a crowd, “disguised or masked, or 
covered by darkness can confer de-individuation even on those who are not state 
functionaries acting under orders” (Waller 217).  History shows de-individuation 
does not have to be a significant reason for the commission of an atrocity.   “In 
Bosnia and Rwanda, for instance, many of the atrocities were inflicted on 
neighbors by other neighbors, and even by one’s own close relatives” (Waller 
217).   
As a social animal, people generally want to be liked and to fit in with 
others in a group.  Military units teach teamwork, bonding and reliance on one 
another so when in a combat situation each person in the unit can rely on the 
other to have their back.  Military organization espouses unit cohesion. “Bonds 
soldiers formed with one another in military and paramilitary organizations are 
often stronger than the bonds they will form with anyone else at any other point in 
their lifetimes.  Among people who are bonded together so intensely, there is a 
powerful dynamic of conformity to peer pressure” (Waller 218).  Christopher 
Browning, in his book, Ordinary Men: Reserve Police Battalion 101 and the Final 
Solution in Poland wrote the majority of men in Police Battalion 101 carried out 
their orders to kill Jews, regardless of their feelings, trepidation or repugnance.  
The men knew that if they did not complete their task, the others in the unit could 
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perceive them as not being totally committed to the unit, thus alienating them 
from their support group.  Whether a solder wanted to kill or not, someone had to 
complete the mission and carry out the executions, further causing resentment 
toward the non-conforming individual.  Browning writes, “ Those who did not 
shoot, risked isolation, rejection, an ostracism a very uncomfortable prospect 
within the framework of a tight—knit unit stationed abroad among a hostile 
population, so that the individual had virtually nowhere else to turn for support 
and social contact” (Waller 218-219).  
 
Bystanders 
 
 A bystander is generally one who is present but refrains from 
involvement.   The percentage of bystanders within a population may be between 
50 and 65 percent.  They are primarily concerned for safety and abide by the 
laws of their nation, attend houses of worship and protect their families. Because 
they are the largest group in a population, they have the most potential to make a 
difference and do well: 
Bystanders often respond to events on the basis of a history of 
relationships they have had with the parties involved.  They, refrain 
from assessing and making decisions on the basis of actual events, 
moral principles and human suffering.   They either do not exercise 
prudence or good judgment, which the ancient Greeks regarded an 
essential element of morality. (Staub 185)  
 
In genocide, bystanders can be intimidated easily and switch from one 
side to another while remaining unattached.  While genocide is going on around 
them, bystanders continue to maintain a level of routine to create a sense of 
normalcy.  In any culture the majority of people will go along with the group.  
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They will think, “If everyone else does it, it must be okay.”  Nobody likes to go 
against the grain and be an outsider or concerned by the threat of what they 
would do to you or your family (Baum 161).  Some bystander nations became 
rescuer nations when groups, such as the Jews, were exported to them by 
individual rescuers to be used as safety zones.  During the Armenian genocide, 
the US and Europe became external bystanders by refusing to pressure Turkey 
to cease the murdering of the Armenians.     
In Rwanda, the French interventions in 1990 were supposed to prevent 
more deaths.  In actuality, they transformed from a rescuer nation to a bystander 
nation, if not a perpetrator, by continuing to help the Hutu government militarily 
knowing the Hutus were slaughtering the Tutsis.  Bystanders often respond to 
events on the basis of a history of relationships.  The friendship between 
President Mitterrand of France and the President Habyarimana of Rwanda could 
have possibly clouded the judgment of France’s decision to pick sides.  As for 
responses from other international communities, the US and the UN resisted 
calling the violence genocide so the genocide convention would not be convened 
and generate a push for a response to the calamity unfolding.   
To remain a bystander nation, the US went as far as to resist and slowed 
down a vote in the Security Council on sending back peacekeepers to Rwanda, 
even though US troops were not required. The US refused to provide equipment, 
but insisted on leasing it to the UN. The US and the UN haggled over the amount 
to be paid for the equipment while every day many thousands of people were 
killed (Staub 186).  Traits of a bystander include conformity, passive or active in 
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nature, and lack the ability to think of others as individuals rather than group 
members.  With a change in the social situation, “bystanders can easily become 
perpetrators, particularly if it increases their standing in the group or strengthens 
social bonds” (DeZalia 356). 
 
Rescuers 
 
According Baum, rescuers usually make up between ten and twenty 
percent of the population.  To discern between helping and rescuing you must 
know the intent of the rescuer.  Some perpetrators helped, but they do not rescue 
because their intention is not to save the victim, but for them to benefit from the 
gesture. “In terms of our divisions, the motivations follow accordingly. While 
perpetrators are concerned with “what’s in it for me?” or “What would those in 
authority say?  Bystanders are concerned with “what would the neighbors say”?  
By contrast, rescuers can be defined by an internal motivation expressed what I 
say” (Baum 182).   
In the Holocaust the exact number of altruistic rescuers is not really 
known.  Yad Vashem, the Israeli organization that honors those who risked their 
lives for saving Jews, gives estimates which are considered very low (20,000 
acknowledged rescuers out of a general European population of 750 million).  
Many scholars believe the number is much higher (Baum 182).  Rescuer traits 
include individualism, individuality and autonomy.  They also have a more 
humanistic personality (DeZalia 356).            
Rescuer nations amount to a small number.  Denmark and Bulgaria made 
rescue legendary.  Nation such as Italy and Hungary prior to 1943 and 1944 
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refused to deport Jews to Germany.  Bulgaria’s entire 50,000 member Jewish 
community was spared the Holocaust.  Theirs was the only Jewish community to 
survive intact in Nazi Europe (Baum 205).     
Holland’s Antirevolutionary Church and Germanys Confessing Church, 
Italy’s Assisi villages and France’s Le Mazet, Fay-sur-Lignon, Tence, 
Chabannes, La Suchere, Montbuzat, and the Protestant enclave of Le chanbon-
surLignon.  These religious institutions were responsible for saving many Jewish 
lives.   
At Le Chambon the entire village became a haven for Jews fleeing 
from the Nazis and their French collaborators.  The Chambonnais 
hid Jews in their homes, sometimes as long as four years, provided 
them with forged ID and ration cards and helped them to safety in 
Switzerland.  With their history of Huguenot persecution as a 
religious minority in Catholic France, empathy for Jews as the 
people of the Old Testament, and the powerful leadership and 
example of their pastor and his wife, they helped to save lives. 
(Baum 205)   
 
Consistent with all other rescuers, the Chambonnais rejected any labeling 
of their behavior as heroic.  They said:  “Things had to be done and we 
happened to be there to do them.  It was the most natural thing in the world to 
help these people” (Baum 205).   Thus, the no-victims in genocide are composed 
of a complex mix of perpetrators, bystanders, and rescuers driven by personality 
and circumstance.                                                                
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Chapter 3:  21st Century Potential Genocides  
The world has experienced its first genocide in the first three years of the 
twentieth first century.  The Darfur region in Sudan experienced an enormous 
loss of life when more than 70,000 civilians were killed beginning in February of 
2003.  The Arab militias attacked and killed civilians from the black African tribes 
located in Darfur.  The biggest issue facing the international community at the 
time was whether or not to classify it as genocide.  In July 2004, “the United 
States Congress passed a resolution labeling Darfur genocide.  Then, in early 
September, Secretary of State Colin Powell also used the term, and President 
George W. Bush followed suit in a speech to the United Nations” (Straus 123).  
The United Nations Security Council sent 674 lightly armed African 
Peacekeepers to the Darfur region with a population of six million people. The 
genocide in Darfur is the beginning of a much larger pogrom to follow.  The 
potential for genocides in the future extend to Chechnya, Sudan and Nigeria. 
 
Chechnya 
 
The history of hostilities between Russia and Chechnya goes back many 
centuries. In 1944 Stalin accused the Chechens of working with the Germans 
and deported many of them to Central Asia and Siberia as was their standard 
policy of eliminating an enemy.  Russia would deport its inhabitants, and because 
of a surplus of population, resettle the vacant area with ethnic Russians.  Stalin’s 
policy was reversed in 1956, and the Chechens began to return to their 
homeland, causing violent disputes between the Russians who had resettled in 
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Chechnya and the returning Chechens.   In 1991, with the unraveling of the 
Soviet Union, Chechnya declared independence from Russian domination, which 
led to war from 1994 to 1996.  The new Chechen government was weak, and 
many areas of Chechnya fell under the control of Islamic militants.  In 1999 the 
Islamic extremist behind an uprising in neighboring Dagestan, provoked a 
Russian invasion, igniting war (Fredholm 317).  The war in Chechnya has given 
the Russians a stronger presence militarily in the Caucasus, as well as a political 
point to rally Russian public opinion.  The popular support of “the war in 
Chechnya has reached levels of over 60 percent  Moscow has used the war to 
successfully tighten the level of security throughout the Federation, as well as to 
strike against criminal activities through an increased level of law enforcement 
activity” (Fredholm 318).   
The first fighting began in what is now called the “battle for Grozny.”  
Russian military forces initiated an all-out attack on the city.  When this failed, the 
Russians began an air assault that caused many civilian casualties.  The 
bombing was so intense it “has been calculated that an average of over 4000 
blasts were recorded per hour during the most intensive fighting.  This compared 
to Sarajevo were the highest rate recorded was 800” (Cornell 88).  After Grozny 
fell to the Russians the barbaric nature of the incursion began to surface.  
Documented reports show systematic torture of prisoners in Russian “filtration 
camps” and all men aged 15 to 60 were removed and sent to camps in Mozdok, 
North Ossetia.  The village of Samashki in April of 1995 was bombed heavily and 
300 Russian troops entered the village “shooting indiscriminately and throwing 
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grenades into basements; civilians were tortured and executed” (Cornell 90).  
The killings were unfolding while the world watched.  The Organization for 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and the Helsinki Watch group 
documented the destruction and the gross human rights violations against the 
civilian population by Russian troops.    
Reactions by the international community were quite reserved.  Because 
Chechnya was not recognized as an independent country by most in the 
international community, the situation was looked at as a Russian internal matter.  
The only organization taking a stance against the Russian atrocities was the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ).  It went so far as to “urge the Council of 
Europe to refuse Russian membership, and moreover appealed to the United 
States to freeze a $6.8 billion IMF loan to Russia, deploring the bleak reaction to 
the ‘enormous’ crimes committed by the Russian military” (Cornell 94).  Stalin’s 
use of deportation and Putin’s use of the Russian military to remove or vanquish 
a segment of their non-Russian citizens equates to genocide.  The Chechnya 
people have never accepted Russian domination since they were conquered in 
the nineteenth century and probably never will. The relative peace in Chechnya 
is fragile; only because of military garrisoning, can Russia maintain control of its 
Chechen citizens.  The history between Russia and its renegade republic, and 
the brutality of its citizens leaves the question on what form of genocide the 
Russians employ next against the Chechens.   
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Sudan  
 
Sudan has experienced civil war since 1956, when it gained its 
independence from British rule.  Sudan is located in Northwest Africa, between 
Egypt and Uganda, with the Red Sea to the north.  Sudan is the largest country 
in Africa.  It is roughly the same size as the East Coast of the United States 
extending to the Mississippi River.  The ethnic population of Sudan is 
Arab/Muslim north and black African/Christian and animist south.  The official 
religion is Islam, indigenous beliefs, and southern Sudan is Christian. Even 
though they are in Africa, they identify themselves more as Arab and Muslim.  
They are more aligned with the Middle East than Africa, even though their culture 
and Islamic practices are a mix of African culture and belief systems.  The civil 
war is pitting the North against the South, and as of late the conflict has been 
centered on the regions of Darfur.  The official languages are Arabic and English, 
along with many tribal languages.  The 30 million people located in the northern 
region are Arab speaking Muslims where most of the urban areas are located.  
The southern region has a population of around 8 million and a predominantly 
rural, subsistence economy. 
 Since 1955, the people of Sudan have experienced numerous wars and 
rebellion resulting in major destruction and economic despair.  The conflict has 
severely affected the population of the South, resulting in over 2 million deaths 
and more than 4 million people displaced between 1983 and 2005 (Hirsch 2).  
The Southern Sudanese practice mainly indigenous traditional beliefs, although 
Christian missionaries have converted some. The South also contains many 
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tribal groups and many more languages than are used in the north. The Dinka--
whose population is estimated at more than 1 million--is the largest of the many 
black African tribes in Sudan.  
 In 1958 continuing into the 1980’s, Sudan fell under the leadership 
of many military rulers, most pursuing the path toward path of Arabization and 
Islamicization including the southern regions of Sudan.  In 1979, Colonel Gaafar 
Muhammad Nimeiri gave partial autonomy to the southern Sudan, and with their 
help he was able to stop two rebellion attempts by Darfur and Kordofan who 
were looking for the same autonomy as southern Sudan.  Nimeiri, in 1983 
reversed his earlier ruling abolishing the Southern region’s autonomy and made 
Arabic the official language, replacing English. Nimeiri incorporated Islamic law 
into the penal code including the non-Muslim in the north and the south (US 
Department of State).  
 In July 2002, the Government of Sudan and the southern rebels agreed to 
self-determination and the role of state and religion (Hirsh 3).  At the same time, 
another revolt began to take shape in the Darfur region.  The war began with two 
dissident Sudan liberation Movement/Army SLM/A and Justice and Equality 
Movement (JEM). Both groups were fighting for the agricultural farmers “to 
restructure the country into a New Sudan that would be free from any 
discrimination due to race, ethnicity, religion, culture, or gender” (Deng 158). The 
Sudanese Government supported local militias consisting of Black Arab herders 
(Janjaweed) with weapons and support from the Sudan Armed Forces which 
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resulted in the deaths of over two hundred thousand and many millions 
displaced.   
On May 5, 2006, the Sudanese government and an SLM/A faction signed 
the Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA).  Soon after the peace agreements, violence 
increased from groups who were not part of the DPA.  The peace in Sudan is at 
best fragile. The fighting has been reduced, but the conditions remain the same.  
Darfur’s SLM/A rebels continue to fight for autonomy as well as the southern 
regions that still are economically inferior to the northern regions.  The religious 
dispute between the Arab Muslim population and the southern regions, Christian 
population continues to divide the country on a more spiritual level. 
 
Federal Republic of Nigeria  
 
The history of Nigeria is steeped in tradition of British rule beginning in 
1885.  In the nineteenth century, Britain expanded its trade into the Nigeria 
interior.  This expanded trade led to formation of the Royal Niger Company.  At 
the turn of the twentieth century, the Royal Niger Company fell under the control 
of the British Empire, and in 1914 the area was consolidated and renamed the 
“Colony and Protectorate of Nigeria.” 
       Under British rule the territory was managed as two independent regions.  
The northern region whose leaders were given partial self-government rule and 
were able to, “maintain their “religion-based” structure under an indirect 
regulation arrangement with colonial authorities” (US State).  The southern 
region was required to have a more direct rule from the United Kingdom.  The 
southern regions progressed faster, educationally, socially, culturally and 
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politically.  After World War II, Nigeria became more resentful of foreign 
domination resulting in Nigeria emerging from the war more nationalistic and 
demanded independence resulting in a British legislative constitution “moving 
Nigeria toward representative self-government” (US State).   
Nigeria is a country of over 250 ethnic groups with many mixtures of 
languages, customs, and historical backgrounds.  It is a country with the largest 
population in West Africa, but only about 25 percent live in urban areas.  The 
“largest and most influential ethnic group in the northern region, covering over 
two-thirds of the country, is the Hausa-Fulani, most of whom are Muslim. Other 
major ethnic groups residing in the northern regions are the Nupe, Tiv, and 
Kanuri. The Yoruba people are predominant in the southwest” (US State).  About 
half of the Yorubas are Christian and half Muslim. Of the Christian population, 
Catholicism is predominant among the Igbo, who represent the largest ethnic 
population in the southeast.   
Nigeria’s official language is English and due to the wide variety of 
different ethnic or tribal languages most use a second language of Hausa, 
Yoruba, Igbo, Fulani, and Kanuri depending on location within the country.  
Religious differences and location of each ethnic group, while bringing diversity 
to Nigeria, is also responsible for the power struggle and fractures the 
implementation of their nationalistic desires. 
  Nigeria claimed complete independence from the British in 1960.  The 
country was divided into “three distinct regions, (northern, western, and eastern) 
under a constitution that provided for a parliamentary form of government” (US 
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State). Later in 1963, the Midwest region was created and Nigeria established 
itself as a new federal republic, forming a new constitution.  Over the next forty 
years, Nigeria experienced many hostile and violent military and civilian coups.  
Whereas the leadership had its roots determined how the issues of ethnicity 
would be handled.  After the first military takeover in 1966, the country was 
divided into twelve states.  Each state wanted their doctrines to be honored and 
to become part of the constitution.  This led to civil wars and the deaths of 
thousands.   
With the discovery of oil in 1970, Nigeria became more industrial and less 
dependent on its agrarian history, leaving a large number of the population 
economically depressed.  After many years of military rule, civilian leadership 
and a democratic government reemerged in May 1999 and began the arduous 
task of rebuilding a country crumbling around them.  Even with strict authoritarian 
rule, many “incidents of ethno-religious and community conflicts, which derived 
from distorted use of oil revenue wealth, flaws in the 1999 constitution, and 
longstanding disputes over the distribution of land and other resources” (US 
State).    
The ethno-religious violence is being carried forth into the twenty first 
century.  In March of 2010, over 500 Christians, “mostly women and children 
near the city of Jos, long a center of tensions between Christians and Muslim 
were killed.  The dead were Christians and members of an ethnic group that had 
been feuding with the Hausa-Fulani.  The assailants were identified as Muslim 
herders who on , “early Sunday morning, the attackers set upon the villagers with 
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machetes, killing women and children in their homes and ensnaring the men who 
tried to flee in fishnets and animal traps, then massacring them, according to a 
Nigerian rights group whose investigators went to the area” (Nossiter 1). 
 Nigeria is infested with militias having one of two objectives.  Some such 
as the (Duduwa Peoples Congress (OPC), Movement for the Actualization of the 
Sovereign State of Biafra (MASSOB) and Egbesu direct their attacks toward the 
government of Nigeria and any ethnic group loyal to the government of Nigeria.  
The other group’s violence is directed at any ethnic group or community they 
consider their enemy.  Nigeria’s militia problems began in the 1990’s, “when 
military rule became more repressive and intolerant on the one hand, and 
blatantly partisan and corrupt on the other. Under military rule, the state became 
and instrument for executing an ethnic agenda” (Ikelegbe 507).  Political 
weakness and ethnic pluralism has created an environment in Nigeria ripe for 
genocide.  Without external resources and a commitment from the Nigerian 
government to stop the policy of inclusion and exclusion in government to 
produce disadvantage groups, violence toward its civilians will only increase 
(Ikelegbe 493). 
 
United Nations Role 
 
 The United Nations had little success since its inception, and under the 
current structure will have little effect in the twentieth first century. The 
bureaucracy in the United Nations is detrimental to the rapid reaction to a 
genocidal crisis. Under current guidelines, the UN Security Council determines if 
a new peacekeeping operation is needed and when and how to deploy new 
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peacekeeping troops.  Before any peacekeeping force is constructed, the United 
Nations has developed eight steps that must be completed before a 
peacekeeping force can be established (un.org).   
  Step one is the initial consultation as, “conflict develops, worsens, or 
approaches resolution; the UN is frequently involved in a number of consultations 
to determine the best response by the international community. The UN will then 
dispatch a technical field assessment mission “(United Nations).  The technical, “ 
assessment mission analyzes and assesses the overall security, political, 
military, humanitarian and human rights situation on the ground, and its 
implications for a possible operation” (United Nations). 
 Step two, As soon as security conditions permit, an assessment team is 
dispatched. The assessment team mission is to, “ analyzes and assesses the 
overall security, political, military, humanitarian and human rights situation on the 
ground, and its implications for a possible operation” (United Nations).  The 
results are sent to the UN for review by the UN Secretary-General and the 
Security Council. 
 Step three, if a peacekeeping requirement is needed; the Security Council 
adopts a resolution.  The Security Council resolution, “sets out the operation’s 
mandate and size, and details the tasks it will be responsible for performing. The 
budget and resources is then subject to General Assembly approval” (United 
Nations). 
 Step four, appointment of senior officials-The Secretary-General normally 
appoints a Head of Mission (usually a Special Representative) to direct the 
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peacekeeping operation. The Head of Mission reports to the Under-Secretary-
General for Peacekeeping Operations at the UN Headquarters. The Secretary-
General also appoints a peacekeeping operation’s Force Commander and Police 
Commissioner, and senior civilian staff. The Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations (DPKO) and the Department of Field Support (DFS) are then 
responsible for staffing the civilian components of a peacekeeping operation. 
 Step five is the planning and deployment phase. This involves, “the 
planning for the political, military, operational and support (i.e., logistics and 
administration) aspects of the peacekeeping operation. The planning phase 
usually involves the establishment of a Headquarters-based joint working group 
or integrated mission task force, with participation of all relevant UN departments, 
funds and programs” (United Nations).  
 Step six is the deployment of an operation proceeds then as quickly as 
possible, taking into account the security and political conditions on the ground. It 
often starts with an advance team to establish mission headquarters and leads to 
a gradual build-up to encompass all components and regions, as required by the 
mandate (United Nations). 
 Step seven, since the UN has no standing army or police force of its own, 
and Member States are asked to contribute military and police personnel 
required for each operation. Peacekeepers wear their countries’ uniform and are 
identified as UN Peacekeepers only by a UN blue helmet or beret and a badge.  
 Step eight, the peacekeepers report to the Security Council, the 
Secretary-General and will then provide regular reports to the Security Council 
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on the implementation of the mission mandate. The Security Council reviews 
these reports and briefings, and renews and adjusts the mission mandate, as 
required, until the missions is completed or closed. 
 The Rwandan Genocide was carried out by the Hutu’s in less than 100 
days.  The United Nations administrative nightmare rendered them impotent in 
their ability to react to the genocide.  If the UN wants to prevent genocide in the 
twenty first century, genocide needs to be identified in a more efficient and timely 
manner.  
 To exacerbate the United Nations diminished capacity to assist, it is 
currently operating fourteen peacekeeping operations around the world with the 
assistance of over 114 countries participating.  Since 1948 the UN peacekeeping 
units have been deployed to hot spots around the world.  
 
 Table 9.  Current United Nations Peacekeeping Forces 
Location Date Uniformed 
Personnel 
Civilian 
Personnel 
Fatalities Budget 7/2010-
6/2011 
Western 
Sahara 
 
1991 
231 283 15 $60,038,500 
Haiti 2004 12,055 1,933 160 $853,827,400 
Darfur 2004 23,055 4,334 81 $1,808,127,500 
Syria 1974 1,045 144 43 $47,806,900 
Cyprus 1964 980 153 180 $58,156,300 
Lebanon 1978 11,766 996 291 $518,710,200 
Kosovo 1999 16 398 54 $47,874,400 
Liberia 2003 9,402 5,641 154 $524,052,800 
Timor-
Leste 
2006 1463 1,427 10 $206,311,600 
India-
Pakistan 
1949 44 72 11 $16,146,000 
Middle 
East 
1948 152 215 50 $60,704,800 
Democratic 
Republic of 
2010 19,136 4,332 10 $1,369,000,000 
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the Congo 
Côte 
d'Ivoire 
2004 9,062 1,383 72 $485,078,200 
Sudan 2005 10,456 4,278 59 $1,008,026,300 
 
  An example of the long term commitments required when peacekeeping 
forces are committed; the Middle East Peacekeeping force has been assigned to 
their current operations for over 60 years. Though the contingent is small, they 
have incurred 152 UN personnel deaths.  The current operating budget for the 
UN Peacekeeping forces from July 2010 to Jun 2001 is $7.83 billion dollars 
(United Nations).  As tensions increase in the Middle East and Africa and the 
potential for long term assistance, more troops and money is not a practical 
solution.   
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Conclusion 
 In conclusion, genocide will continue to exist and proliferate in the twenty 
first century.  Genocide, as evidenced by the previous century, cannot logically 
be eradicated or totally prevented.  This is not to say the international community 
should not continue to try or at least reduce the effects and the tremendous loss 
of life as a result of genocide.  The question then becomes why hasn’t the 
international community been able to prevent, identify (in a timely manner) or 
intercede to stop the genocides of the twentieth and the beginning of the 
twentieth first century?  The problem lies in the international communities’ 
inability to agree on what constitutes genocide and the appropriate reaction to 
the threat.   
 During the genocide in Rwanda few wanted to recognize the mass killings 
of Tutsis as genocide.  The year before the United States had the experience of 
losing peacekeeping forces in Somalia, resulting in Presidential Decision 
Directive 25, which limits the United States commitment to UN peacekeeping 
operations, with the exception of genocide.  Also, U.S. military forces remain 
under the control of the United States President limiting the command and 
control of any UN Peacekeeping force.  Other member nations have many 
restrictions or caveats as well.  If members of the United Nations can restrict the 
locations, control, responsibility, authority and training of the United Nations 
forces from their respective country, the UN forces will be inefficient and 
ineffective.      
69 
 
 
 
 
  With little legal grounds to enforce international Law to combat genocide, 
the UN can only react after the fact.  Progress has been made in bringing the 
high ranking perpetrators to the International Criminal Court (ICC).  The numbers 
are small and unless arresting authority is expanded, many perpetrators will 
escape conviction.  The United Nations should establish a commission of experts 
to refine the UN arsenal of sanctions.  United States Presidential Directive 25 
does not support any form of a military for the United Nations. The only option, 
besides sending in peacekeepers to an area of concern, is to implement trade 
sanctions against the country in question.  The problem with sanctions is they 
currently do more harm to the people (victims) than the government.  This 
coupled with genocidal organizations like Al Qaeda, where there are no borders 
thus eliminating sanctions as the obligatory punishment.  The heart of global 
governance must be prevention in advance of destructive violence. The ICC is an 
important step in that direction. Unfortunately the ICC has already met strong 
resistance by great powers; some of the strongest and most vocal opponents are 
countries known for an intensive official Human Rights dialogue, such as the US 
and France.  
 The Holocaust has become the standard by which all genocides are 
measured. With the rise of Muslim extremism, state sanctioned genocide has 
now become religious based genocide and the traditional peacekeeping 
operations need to change with this new threat. The current method of evaluating 
genocides is after the fact studies first established with the documenting of the 
Holocaust (Savage).  
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 The study of historical genocide has many limitations.  It cannot predict, 
only offer explanations from hindsight for why genocide has occurred.  It is 
accurate to say genocide has never been prevented in either the twentieth or the 
first part of the twenty first century, and the present capabilities do not render a 
positive outlook for prevention.  Prevention indicates genocide can be stopped 
before it starts. In reality, genocide cannot be prevented until it is already 
underway.  Prevention, beginning in the seventh stage (Extermination Stage) of 
Dr. Stanton’s Eight Stages of Genocide is seven steps too late (Savage). The 
focus of stopping genocide will require expediency in decision making, rapid 
deployment of troops and full UN member support. The United Nations 
multilayered system from fact finding to implementation of troops has been too 
cumbersome due to politics and legal wrangling to be of any good.   
 If genocide is to be stopped, the United Nations must take the lead role 
and set a guideline on the lowest threshold of what constitutes genocide and act 
immediately.  The General Assembly in consultation with the UN Secretary-
General should be given the ultimate authority on deciding when and where 
genocide is occurring and the level of force they will require and authorize to use 
in stopping the genocide. 
 The time has come for the United Nations to have a supervised rapid 
deployment, self-contained force that can be to any location within a 48 hour 
period.  These units need to be strategically located near designated hot spots 
and all member countries should be required to assign a military specialty unit 
whose sole training purpose is to support all UN directed mandates.  The largest 
71 
 
 
 
 
issue for these units will be the logistical support needed to maintain their 
mission (Savage).  
 The peacekeeping orders in Bosnia and Rwanda constituted nothing more 
than observing with little authority for the on-scene commander to intervene in 
the killing.  To send a lightly armed force, such as the Belgian contingent, to a 
situation like Rwanda, is a recipe for disaster.  The international community has a 
moral responsibility to protect the innocent.  With a paradigm shift away from 
talking about prevention and more a call to action the opportunities for genocide 
will diminish.   
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